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Over the past twenty years, neuroscientists have discovered 
that brain maturation continues through an individual’s mid-
twenties. The United States Supreme Court cited this research to 
support its abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. 
Simmons. Now the Court is faced with two cases that challenge the 
constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment 
without parole. Many believe these studies indicate that juveniles 
are both less culpable for their actions and more likely to reform; 
therefore, life in prison for juveniles is disproportionate, cruel, and 
unusual. However, others caution against the use of these studies in 
deciding issues of juvenile justice. This iBrief summarizes the cases 
currently before the Court, presents the arguments for and against 
the use of neuroscience in the juvenile justice debate, and analyzes 
the impact these cases will have on the future of neuroscience’s 
role in juvenile justice. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Advances in technology since the early 1990s have transformed the 
way neuroscientists study the juvenile brain.2 In the past, scientists studied 
the brain through post-mortem examinations,3 animal studies, and 
computational models.4 Through the relatively new technologies of 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), scientists can study the development of the brain over time 
in a noninvasive manner.5
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Rice 
University, magna cum laude. 
 Studies using these imaging technologies have 
revealed that the juvenile brain, once thought to be fully developed in early 
adolescence, continues to develop in key regions through the teenage years 
2 See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2007).  
3 William J. Katt, Roper and the Scientific Amicus, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 263 
(2009). 
4 Snead, supra note 2, at 1273. 
5 Id. at 1273–82. 
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and into the early to mid-twenties.6 In particular, the prefrontal cortex of the 
frontal lobe—responsible for executive functions such as impulse control, 
reasoning, and judgment—continues to develop through adolescence.7 
Criminal defense attorneys have begun using this research to argue for 
lesser sentences for juveniles as compared to adults; such efforts led to the 
abolition of the death penalty for juveniles in 2005.8
I. ROPER V. SIMMONS, SULLIVAN V. FLORIDA AND GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
 
¶2 Writing for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Stevens used 
neuroimaging research of juvenile brain development to help support the 
holding that applying the death penalty to juveniles is unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment.9 Justice Stevens found juveniles to be less 
culpable than adults for the same crimes because juveniles’ personalities are 
still developing, and thus, there is a greater possibility that character 
deficiencies will be reformed.10 The Court held that juveniles’ diminished 
culpability weakens the force behind the retribution and deterrence 
justifications for punishment.11 The Court rejected the idea of considering 
age on a case by case basis noting that such a practice could lead to the 
unfortunate consequence where, “[i]n some cases, a defendant’s youth may 
even be counted against him.”12 While acknowledging the difficulty of line 
drawing with categorical rules, the Court nevertheless chose eighteen years 
of age as the categorical dividing line between juveniles and adults because 
that is where society has often drawn the line.13 Justice Scalia, dissenting in 
Roper, argued that the Court’s reliance on scientific studies was faulty.14 He 
noted that the studies were never tested in an adversarial setting and the 
Court did not know whether the studies were methodologically sound.15
¶3 In developments post-Roper, the Supreme Court has heard oral 
argument in two cases regarding the constitutionality of juvenile life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (JLWOP): Graham v. 
 
                                                     
6 Michelle Haddad, Note, Catching Up: The Need for New York State to Amend 
its Juvenile Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional, and Normative 
Trends over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
455, 477–78 (2009). 
7 Id. 
8 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
9 Id. at 569–78. 
10 Id. at 570. 
11 Id. at 571. 
12 Id. at 572–73. 
13 Id. at 574. 
14 Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. 
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Florida and Sullivan v. Florida.16 Graham involves a challenge to a 
JLWOP sentence for Terrance Jamar Graham, who was convicted as an 
accomplice to an armed burglary and an attempted robbery of a restaurant.17 
Graham was sixteen at the time of the crime. Sullivan involves Joe Harris 
Sullivan, sentenced to JLWOP for a sexual battery committed when 
Sullivan was thirteen years old.18
¶4 Defense attorneys in both cases have relied on psychological and 
scientific studies to argue that the reduced culpability of juveniles renders 
the JLWOP punishment disproportionate and unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment.
 
19 Critics of this approach argue that, for a variety of 
reasons explored in Part III, neuroimaging studies should not be considered 
when deciding the constitutionality of JLWOP.20
¶5 The Court may: (1) decide to implement a categorical rule, holding 
that it is unconstitutional for juveniles under a certain age to receive a 
JLWOP sentence, (2) require that judges take age into account on a case by 
case basis, or (3) hold that JLWOP sentences are constitutional for both 
thirteen year-olds like Sullivan and seventeen year-olds like Graham. The 
oral arguments provide some insight into how the Court may resolve the 
cases. In both proceedings, Chief Justice Roberts proposed the 
individualized, case by case analysis solution, noting “perhaps it makes 
sense to consider in a particular instance whether the penalty is 
disproportionate, given the juvenile’s characteristics.”
 
21 Chief Justice 
Roberts further noted, “[i]f you go on a case by case basis, there are no line-
drawing problems. You just simply say age has to be considered as a matter 
of the Eighth Amendment.”22
                                                     
16 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2009); Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-
7621 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2009).  
 The implications that the Court’s potential 
outcomes would have on the use of neuroscience in juvenile justice are 
explored in Part IV. 
17 Lauren Fine, Comment, Death Behind Bars: Examining Juvenile Life Without 
Parole in Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 24, 27–28 (2009). 
18 Id. at 25–26. 
19 See generally Brief for Petitioner, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (U.S. July 
16, 2009); Brief for Petitioner, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. July 16, 
2009). 
20 See, e.g., Snead, supra note 2, at 1288–89. 
21 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Graham, No. 08-7412. 
22 Id. at 37. 
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II. THE ARGUMENT THAT NEUROSCIENCE SHOULD INFLUENCE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
A. The Developing Brain During Adolescence 
¶6 Supporters of the use of neuroscience in this debate point to the new 
knowledge that neuroscientists have gained from the advent of MRI and 
fMRI technology. The MRI “constructs a computerized image of the brain 
by measuring the signal strengths of the various radio frequencies emitted 
by the proton nuclei of atoms in brain tissue when the protons are placed in 
a strong magnetic field.23 Using MRI technology, scientists have discovered 
that the frontal cortex—the part of the brain that controls executive 
functions—is the last part of the brain to fully develop.24 These executive 
functions include “impulse control, reasoning, abstract thinking, imagining, 
planning behavior, and anticipating consequences.”25 The frontal lobe 
develops through pruning, in which a decrease in gray matter makes cells 
more efficient, and an increase of myelin (white matter) around brain cells 
increases “the speed and reliability of brain communication.”26
¶7 Because the frontal lobe is still developing, juveniles’ brains rely 
more on the amygdala, at the base of the brain, when reacting to stressful 
stimuli.
 
27 The amygdala controls behavior related to instinct and survival.28 
“Actions controlled by this sector of the brain are characterized as 
emotional, impulsive, and often aggressive.”29 This research indicates that 
“novel situations and emotional arousal especially challenge adolescents’ 
ability to exercise judgment and self-control and contribute to short-sighted, 
impulsive decisions and risky behavior.”30 Scientists have learned this 
information through the use of the fMRI, “which essentially amounts to 
making a movie of changes in blood flow in the brain as test subjects are 
exposed to stimuli or perform various tasks.”31
                                                     
23 Snead, supra note 2, at 1281. 
 
24 Haddad, supra note 6, at 479. 
25 Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility 
and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 59 (2007). 
26 Christopher L. Dore, Comment, What to Do with Omar Khadr? Putting a 
Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and 
Moral Culpability, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1281, 1307 (2008). 
27 Feld, supra note 25, at 60–61. 
28 Dore, supra note 26, at 1306. 
29 Id. 
30 Feld, supra note 25, at 61. 
31 Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917, 
924 (2009). 
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B. The Argument that Neuroimaging Studies Should Affect the Law 
¶8 Many argue that we must use what we have learned from the 
advances in technology since the early 1990s in our assessment of what 
punishments are proportionate for juvenile offenses.32 Proponents note that 
neuroimaging studies, in addition to psychological studies, are “the best, 
most sophisticated source of information about how children actually 
develop.”33 Further, neuroscience validates the wealth of psychological 
studies on juveniles’ immaturity, thus lending a “hard science” base to a 
“soft science” argument.34 The studies provide scientific data that “simply 
reinforces the (once) noncontroversial idea that, as a group, young people 
differ from adults in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative 
culpability, deterrability, and potential for rehabilitation.”35
¶9 Proponents of the importance of neuroscience also argue that 
juveniles, because of their neurological and psychological limitations, are 
less able to participate in the justice process than adults.
 
36 They are “less 
able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent to searches, 
participate in identification procedures, waive Miranda rights, confess, 
waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea.”37 They may not be able to understand 
judicial proceedings and they may be less able to help their attorney assist 
them.38 Further, neuroscience suggests juveniles are less able to make 
important decisions in a “rational and self-protective manner.”39
¶10 Juvenile advocates also argue, as Justice Stevens acknowledged in 
Roper, that the traditional justifications for punishment are weakened by the 
scientific evidence rendering juveniles less culpable for their criminal 
acts.
 These 
inabilities could lead to results that our criminal justice system is meant to 
avoid, such as false confessions or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
40
                                                     
32 See, e.g., Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and 
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 333 (2006). 
 Science and common sense indicate that juveniles are not as 
33 Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and 
Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 507 (2009).  
34 Feld, supra note 25, at 61. 
35 Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 94 (2009). 
36 See id. at 111–15. 
37 Id. at 111. 
38 Id. at 112. 
39 Id. 
40 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“Once the diminished 
culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological 
justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to 
adults.”). 
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blameworthy as adults.41 Further, and perhaps most importantly, they have a 
great potential to reform and rehabilitate as their brains mature and their 
personalities develop.42 As with the death penalty, life without parole is less 
of a deterrent for juveniles because “the same characteristics that render 
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less 
susceptible to deterrence.”43 Justice Stevens notes that juveniles are much 
less likely to engage in a cost-benefit analysis.44 Further, Justice Stevens 
writes that “[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty 
is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a 
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”45
¶11 Finally, proponents of the use of neuroscience in the JLWOP debate 
argue that, unlike many situations, the science is relatively easy to 
incorporate into the law. Unlike many other uses for neuroscience in 
criminal law, such as mental retardation, the science here could be applied 
accurately to a class without the need for neuroimaging in individual 
cases.
 The same logic 
applies to JLWOP, the most severe penalty for any person regardless of age 
in some jurisdictions. 
46
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TURNING TO NEUROSCIENCE 
 
¶12 While many find the arguments for using neuroscience in the 
JLWOP debate persuasive, others caution against its use for a number of 
reasons. The central criticism involves the quality of the scientific data. 
Brain imaging research is “still in its infancy.”47 When courts rely upon 
scientific evidence, there is always a risk of bad or misused data; the 
novelty of brain imaging research increases this risk.48 “[O]ver time, the 
high-quality work can be distinguished from the low, and data can be 
applied in an increasingly fine-grained way.”49
¶13 There has been criticism of the studies used by the Court in Roper 
and other similar studies.
 
50 Many of the studies have small sample sizes and 
potential sample selection biases.51
                                                     
41 See id. 
 Further, there were flaws within the 
42 See Maroney, supra note 35, at 110–11. 
43 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
44 See id. at 572. 
45 Id. at 571. 
46 See Maroney, supra note 35, at 94. 
47 Buss, supra note 33, at 509. 
48 Id. at 507. 
49 Id. at 508. See also Katt, supra note 3, at 270 (“Science is constantly evolving 
as technology and human knowledge advances.”). 
50 See, e.g., Katt, supra note 3, at 255. 
51 See Aronson, supra note 31, at 924. 
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studies. In one study, the participants were presented with black and white 
images from the 1970s, which may have caused juvenile participants to 
react differently than adults independently of their brain development.52 It 
appears that this study, important for the understanding of the amygdala, 
was never formally published in a peer-reviewed journal.53
¶14 One criticism, which repeatedly arises, is that scientists have not 
gone far enough to link differences in individual brains to differences in 
behavior.
 
54 Many scientists do not agree that the studies should be used to 
guide the Court’s decision in cases like Graham and Sullivan.55 These 
scientists are uncomfortable introducing neuroscience “into the legal system 
before it is understood exactly how specific brain traits relate to the real-life 
decision making and behavior of teens in high-stress situations.”56
¶15 Many scientists who understand the weaknesses in the data and 
their link to actual behavior are concerned that judges and legislators will 
not be able to accurately assess the data.
 
57 In particular, amicus curiae briefs 
are not subject to the gate keeping and the normal checks involved with 
scientific evidence, including cross-examination of witnesses.58 There is the 
further danger that lawyers, in order to compete in the adversarial process, 
will oversimplify the scientific evidence and mislead the judge or justices.59 
Due to the limitations on a court, and particularly on the Supreme Court, in 
assessing the accuracy of the evidence, some argue that scientific evidence 
should only be influential in a juvenile justice debate held in a legislature 
rather than a courtroom.60
¶16 Another argument made by those who oppose the use of 
neuroscience research in the Supreme Courts’ decisions is that we must 
exercise caution when making direct connections between biology and 
criminality.
 
61 Critics note that “[c]riminal law and neuroscience have been 
engaged in an ill-fated and sometimes tragic affair for over two hundred 
years.”62
                                                     
52 Id. at 925–26. 
 This concern is further alarming because of the trust people place 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 15, at 148. 
55 See Aronson, supra note 31, at 928. 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Buss, supra note 33, at 507. 
58 Katt, supra note 3, at 254. 
59 Maroney, supra note 35, at 160. 
60 See id. at 169. 
61 See Aronson, supra note 31, at 929 (“[W]e must not submit to a new kind of 
biological determinism which posits that behavior is merely the ‘calculable 
[consequence] of an immense assembly of neurons firing.’”) (citation omitted). 
62 Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in 
Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 183 (2009). 
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in science.63 These critics point to the fact that more than biology must be at 
play because, despite similar brain development, most juveniles do not 
commit heinous crimes.64
¶17 Proponents of allowing state legislatures to make decisions 
regarding JLWOP point out the impracticalities of alternative approaches 
when using neuroimaging data.
  
65 First, the age limit that one must draw 
with a categorical rule is very difficult to draw according to the 
neuroimaging research.66 Much of the research indicates that brains are 
developing into an individual’s mid-twenties.67 This age range does not 
comport with what the law and society have traditionally recognized as the 
line between adolescence and adulthood. Further, if individuals are judged 
on a case by case basis, perhaps the elderly would be less culpable for their 
crimes because their neurons are not as efficient as a middle-aged adult.68
¶18 Perhaps the strongest argument raised by opponents of neuroscience 
in the JLWOP debate is that this issue presents a moral and legal question, 
not a scientific one.
 
69 Many would argue that, while the neuroscience may 
show that juveniles are less culpable than adults, they are still culpable 
enough to be punished with life without parole.70 “Relative deficiencies do 
not necessarily take juveniles below a legal threshold but may instead show 
that they exceed it by a lower margin.”71 This is an argument that Justice 
O’Connor made in her dissent in Roper,72
IV. THE ROLE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE  
POST-SULLIVAN AND GRAHAM 
 and it is an argument that may 
very well influence the Court in their decisions in Graham v. Florida and 
Sullivan v. Florida. 
¶19 The effectiveness of using neuroimaging results as an argument for 
juvenile justice reform will be greatly affected by how the Supreme Court 
rules in Sullivan and Graham. If the Court decides that the sentences are 
constitutional in both cases, juvenile advocates will have to attempt to 
                                                     
63 See Katt, supra note 3, at 269–70 (“[O]ur reverence of science is such that 
questioning it seems almost ridiculous.”). 
64 See Aronson, supra note 31, at 929–30. 
65 See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 35, at 152–54. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 152. 
68 See, e.g., id. at 153–54. 
69 See Maroney, supra note 35, at 150; Buss, supra note 33, at 510; Aronson, 
supra note 31, at 928 (“[S]ome commentators . . . [believe] capital punishment 
is an ethical and moral issue, not a scientific one.”). 
70 See Maroney, supra note 35, at 150. 
71 Id. 
72 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 591 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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persuade legislatures to make an exception for juveniles under a certain age 
or eliminate the penalty altogether. Given the political pressure to be tough 
on crime, this would be a difficult task. “It is an unfortunate political reality 
that modern crime policy tends to be a one-way ratchet consistently 
trending in the direction of more punishment.”73
¶20 If the Supreme Court holds that judges must consider a defendant’s 
age in order to comport with the Eighth Amendment, individual defense 
attorneys will be left to make the reduced culpability argument based on 
neuroimaging in each individual case. While it seems attorneys could be 
successful based on the argument above that science is persuasive, the only 
systematic review of cases in which this was attempted reveals that it is 
actually a rather ineffective strategy.
 
74 The cases “strongly suggest that 
neuroscience does not materially shape legal decision makers’ beliefs and 
values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of 
those beliefs and values.”75 This is made more difficult by the idea that the 
elements of a crime under the law and the implications of the scientific 
findings do not track each other.76 For example, “intentional mens rea asks 
only whether a defendant desired or knew that a result would obtain, while 
neuroscientific arguments invite a focus on substantive irrationality 
notwithstanding specific intent.”77 This research, while limited to one study, 
suggests that presenting neuroimaging research on a case by case basis 
approach, as Chief Justice Roberts seemed to advocate in the oral arguments 
for Graham and Sullivan, would have little effect on the current state of 
juvenile life without parole.78
¶21 The third path the Supreme Court may choose is to set an age below 
which it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment 
without parole. This result would be the most favorable for proponents of 
incorporating neuroimaging research into juvenile justice. Because the 
defense attorneys largely argued the cases based on the neuroscientific and 
psychological research, a categorical rule would seem to validate their 
arguments. This result would leave open the door for incorporating 
additional neuroscientific research into juvenile justice policy in the future. 
 
                                                     
73 Maroney, supra note 35, at 169. 
74 See id. at 93. 
75 Id. at 89. 
76 Id. at 93. 
77 Id. at 94. 
78 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2009) (“[P]erhaps it makes sense to consider in a particular 
instance whether the penalty is disproportionate.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
¶22 The Graham and Sullivan cases currently before the Supreme Court 
will likely have a significant impact on the role that neuroimaging 
technology plays in making future decisions regarding juvenile justice. 
While there are staunch proponents of using neuroscientific research to 
determine what punishments are disproportionate for juveniles, there are 
also many arguments against it. The Court’s decision will, implicitly if not 
explicitly, validate the arguments on one side or the other. If the Court fails 
to create a categorical ban on life without parole for juveniles below a 
certain age, proponents of incorporating neuroimaging research into the 
treatment of juveniles in criminal law will face an uphill battle. If, however, 
the Court does choose to implement a categorical ban, the door for 
neuroscientific research opened in Roper will remain open for juvenile 
advocates to further reform the system in the future. 
 
